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THE PLATINUM PLATTER DOCTRINE IN OHIO:

ARE

PRIVATE POLICE REALLY PRIVATE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps one of the greatest aids to beleaguered municipal and
county police forces in the fight against crime is the use of special
policemen' by department stores and factories. As is often the case
with any good preventative, however, there is great potential for
abuse. While special police beneficially free more regularly employed municipal and county police officers for other duties, their
increasing use is beginning to raise a number of legal issues which
are not easily resolved.
Many of the issues involve constitutional questions of great
importance, particularly in the areas of the fourth 2 and fifth3
amendments, and rights secured by Miranda v. Arizona.4 Questions
also exist concerning the powers and jurisdiction exercisable by the
special police,5 as well as with the numerous statutory grants which
authorize the creation of special police forces.'
1. The term "special police" will be used in this comment to describe those private
security employees who are commissioned or licensed by a governmental subdivision as
special or auxiliary -police officers, who work solely in that capacity for private employers,
rather than for the licensing subdivision. It will be used to describe those security employees
who are variously termed special police, special patrolmen, special deputy sheriffs, auxiliary
police, private guards, special constables, railroad police, or employees of any of the agencies
which contract to provide such services. The term, however, does not include those private
detectives or investigators licensed by the state who do not work for stores or factories as
internal security forces.
For an excellent treatment of the history of police and private police in the United States
and England, see Comment, Who's Watching the Watchmen? The Regulation, or NonRegulation of America's Largest Law Enforcement Institution, The Private Police, 5 GOLDEN
GATE L. REV. 433 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Watchmen].
2. The fourth amendment questions deal with the applicability of the prohibitions
against unreasonable searches and seizures by special police officers who are in one sense
private individuals, but who are also agents of the state. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465 (1921); State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (Franklin County Ct.
App. 1975); People v. Diaz, 85 Misc.2d 41, 376 N.Y.S. 2d 849 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County
1975); Comment, Sticky Fingers, Deep Pockets, and the Long Arm of The Law: Illegal
Searches of Shoplifters by PrivateMerchant Security Personnel, 55 ORE. L. REv. 279 (1976).
3. See State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 271 N.E. 2d 839 (1971), holding that store
employees who detain a suspected shoplifter pursuant to OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.041
(Page 1975) need not give the warnings required by the United States Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Most of the questions concerning special police powers involve their powers to arrest,
to investigate crime in general, and to carry weapons. The jurisdictional problems concern
whether the special policemen are confined to their place of employment or whether they can
operate anywhere within the limits of the licensing subdivision.
6. In Ohio there are no less than five statutes dealing with the creation of special police
officers. See Section II infra and note 9 infra.
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Moreover, since the status of special police officers has not been
settled, a situation has developed similar to the now overruled
"silver platter doctrine." 7 This doctrine involved the sharing
of illicit evidence between state and federal law enforcement officers,'
while the modern form, which might be called a "platinum platter,"
involves widespread sharing of illicit evidence between private and
regular police officers.
The major purposes of this comment will be to review relevant
Ohio statutory material as well as some of the major judicial decisions in the hope of stimulating thought and action to correct the
existing problems, and to provide some useful material to practitioners who are involved with matters concerning special police.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE OHIO SPECIAL POLICE STATUTES

The natural starting point in analyzing the legal issues surrounding the use of special police is to survey the statutes that
authorize their creation and define their powers. In Ohio, there is a
multi-level statutory "hodge-podge" that authorizes various state
government subdivisions to commission special police to supplement their regular police forces.' In addition, two statutes authorize
certain enumerated private organizations to employ special police, 0
and yet another allows any store employee to detain shoplifters."
Finally, the common law allows the creation of non-statutory deputy sheriffs. 2 Of the statutes mentioned, the Shoplifter Detention
For a brief comparison of other state laws which pertain to licensing and regulation of
special police, see Watchmen, supra note 1, at 450-56; 3 J. KAKALK & S. WILDHORN, PRIVATE
POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 (1971) (Part of a six volume
study prepared by the Rand Corporation for the Dept. of Justice).
7. In Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949), the Court used this term to
describe the then current status of federal involvement in evidence seized by state officials.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 n.2 (1960).
8. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), which put an end to the trade in illegally seized evidence between state and federal
officials.
9. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 737.05 (Page 1976) (Composition and control of police department) [hereinafter cited as the Special Police Statute]; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1907.201
(Page 1976) (Appointment of special constables); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 737.15-.19(Page
1976) (Appointment, powers and duties of village marshals).
10. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4973.17-.99 (Page 1954) (Commissions for special police
for banks, building and loan associations, railroad companies, and atomic energy facilities)
[hereinafter cited as the Railroad Police Statute]; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.04 (Page
1976) (Commissions for special police officers for state universities).
11. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.041 (Page 1975).
12. Although OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 311.04 (Page 1976) authorizes a sheriff to appoint
"in writing, one or more deputies," these appointees are regular county employees. The
creation of special deputies is not authorized by Ohio statute, but is authorized by common
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Statute, the Special Police Statute, and the Railroad Police Statute
will be the focal point of this comment, as well as the common law
use of special deputy sheriffs. These have the most impact on Ohio
citizenry and practitioners, 3 and the most interaction with constitutional issues.
A.

The Shoplifter Detention Statute

The Shoplifter Detention Statute" is not a specific authorization to any governmental subdivision to create or license special
police; rather, it is a blanket grant of the power of detention to any
merchant and his employees with probable cause to believe both
that criminal activity has taken place on the merchant's business
premises in the form of shoplifting, 5 and that the person so detained
has committed the crime.'" The suspect may be detained on or near
the store premises, 7 but in a reasonable manner," for only a reasonlaw. State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 NE.2d 173 (Franklin County Ct. App. 1975);
State ex rel Geyer v. Griffin, 80 Ohio App. 447, 76 N.E.2d 294 (Allen County Ct. App. 1946).
13. These statutes are more or less representative of the others, and the analysis and
observations made will, for the most part, apply to the others. The text of each statute must
be read carefully, since some are more specific than others in defining the powers to be
exercised.
14. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.041 (Page 1975) Detention of Shoplifters:
A merchant or his employee or agent, who has probable cause for believing that
items offered for sale by a mercantile establishment have been unlawfully taken by a
person, may, in order to recover such items without a search or undue restraint or in
order to cause an arrest to be made by a police officer until a warrant can be obtained,
detain such person in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time within the
said mercantile establishment or the immediate vicinity thereof.
Any police officer may, within a reasonable time after such alleged unlawful
taking has been committed, arrest without a warrant, any person he has probable
cause for believing has committed such unlawful taking in a mercantile establishment.
15. A store employee may safely act under the statute without incurring liability when
it can be demonstrated that probable cause existed to support the detention. Isaiah v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 111 Ohio App. 537, 174 N.E.2d 128 (Summit County Ct. App.
1959).
16. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.041 (Page 1975).
17. State v. Stone, 16 Ohio Misc. 160, 241 N.E.2d 302 (Hamilton County Mun. Ct.
1968).
18. Difficulties arise under the statute when an employee who effects the detention also
possesses power to arrest under one of the special police statutes, which is often the case in
major department stores. In such a situation, it is possible to claim that only the authority
of the detention statute is being used, thus rendering the special policeman a private individual. The effect is to allow the special policeman to employ methods of doubtful constitutionality to obtain evidence or confessions which will be fully admissible at trial. See discussion
Section III A. infra. There is no doubt that such methods violate the command of the statute
that all detentions be in a reasonable manner and without a search. However, this argument
has been overlooked by both courts and defense attorneys. Indeed the statute would seem to
preclude any search of a suspected shoplifter by a plain reading of its language. See also State
v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971).
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able time, and, more importantly, without a search." Although detention is allowed, arrests under the statute can only be made by a
regular police officer, and when the proper showing of probable
cause is made, the arrest can be effected without a warrant.
The statute benefits merchants in that it allows store employees who are in the best position to detect shoplifting, to prevent a
substantial loss of merchandise. The statute confers a limited power
only, however, since it does not elevate a merchant or his employee
to the status of a law enforcement officer.20 Despite the advantages
derived from this statute, this approach to crime detection is
fraught with dangers, as it is applicable to situations in which it is
often easy to obtain evidence or confessions which would be in contravention of the constitution, if done by a regularly employed po2
lice officer. '
B.

The Special Police Statute

The Special Police Statute2 2 authorizes the Director of Public
Safety or his equivalent to commission private policemen. These
appointees are not full time civil service employees, but rather work
for private employers. They are controlled by whatever regulations
the legislative authority of the city prescribes, including organization, training, control, procedures, and conduct. Unfortunately, the
regulations can be as detailed or lax as the city desires, since there
19. See State v. Edwards, No. 5171 (Montgomery County Ct. App. filed Nov. 30, 1976)
which involved the removal of stolen property from the defendant's open shopping bag. The
court concluded that since the store security employees had seen the theft occur, the removal
of the stolen items was a lawful repossession of the store's property and not a search in the
constitutional sense. Since the court held that there was no search, the provisions of the
Shoplifter Detention Statute could not have been violated.
20. Even so, detention is a power greater than that possessed by the ordinary citizen
who has no power to arrest or detain for misdemeanors in Ohio. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §
2935.04 (Page 1975). Whether or not one is a law enforcement officer is constitutionally
important in Ohio since the Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted the giving of Miranda
warnings to be necessary only where a law enforcement officer is conducting a custodial
interrogation. See State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971).
21. See analysis in Section II infra.
22. Otio REV. CODE ANN. § 737.05 (Page 1976), which provides in pertinent part:
Composition and control of police department.
The director of public safety of such city shall have the exclusive management and
control of all other officers, surgeons, secretaries, clerks, and employees in the police
department as provided by ordinances or resolution of such legislative authority. He
may commission privatepolicemen, who may not be in the classified list of the department, under such rules and regulations as the legislative authorityprescribes (emphasis added).
See also OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 737.051 (Page 1976) which authorizes the director of
police to create auxiliary police units for a city.
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is no guidance whatsoever in the statute. Thus, licensing requirements,'2 3 qualifications, and duties are left to the cities' discretion.2 4
Because the power over special police is lodged in the local legislature = without any specific guidelines from the Special Police Statute, special police powers and jurisdiction may easily vary from city
to city.
Since the power to commission special police is hazily defined,
it is appropriate to examine the scope of the power that can be
conferred and the powers that are desirable. The response to the
first facet of the inquiry is that all the powers that the state could
confer on its special police can in fact be given by the city to its
private policemen.2 Authority for this conclusion is provided by two
sources other than the broad language of the Special Police Statute
27
itself. The first source is Neapolitan v. United States Steel Corp.,
in which the court stated that a private policeman can possess all
the powers conferred on the state-created railraod police under the
23. Under the ordinances of the City of Dayton, for example, there must be a showing
of necessity for the employment of special police, and the number of licenses granted is
discretionary with the Director of Police. Other requirements include filing and posting of
bond. DAYTON, OHIO, CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES §§ 1025 and 1028 (1971).
See also COLUMBUS, OHIO, CrrY CODE §§ 1907.01-.03 (1971) authorizing the commissioning, bonding, terms of office, and control by the Chief of Police under regulations provided
by the Director of Public Safety.
24. See DAYTON, OHIO, CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 1028-3. This section generally
spells out the duties and requirements for uniforms and possession of weapons, among other
things. It also specifies that a special policeman who has knowledge of a crime should notify
the police and stand by until the regular police arrive. This would seem to conflict with other
provisions conferring the power of arrest and will undoubtedly cause confusion.
The Dayton ordinance also defines a special policeman as "any person in uniform who,
for hire or reward performs any police service within the city of Dayton." DAYTON, OHIO, CODE
OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 1024(a) (1971). The definition excludes private and factory guards
who are defined as being paid by their employer and who are confined to their employer's
property. DAYTON, OHIO, CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 1024(a) (1971). The provision, however, also states that whenever these officers perform a police service while not on the premises of their employer, they shall be deemed special policemen. The ordinance defines a police
service as including, but not being limited to, "the protection of life and property from death,
injury, or damage thereupon, criminal acts, violence, accident or disaster. . . . The detection
and apprehension of persons committing or who have committed any criminal act, whether
felony or misdemeanor." Id. § 1024(d).
25. This is achieved by § 3, Art. XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, which is more commonly known as the Ohio home rule provision. In State ex rel Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio
St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958), the Ohio Supreme Court declared the operation of a police
department to be an exercise of the powers of local government conferred upon it by § 3, Art.
XVIII, with which the state cannot interfere, in the absence of more than mere state concern.
Cf. Neapolitan v. U.S. Steel Corp., 77 Ohio L. Abs. 376, 149 N.E.2d 589 (Mahoning County
Ct. App. 1956).
26. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4973.17-.99 (Page 1954) for an example of the powers
conferred on private railroad police by the state.
27. 77 Ohio L. Abs. 376, 149 N.E.2d 589 (Mahoning County Ct. App. 1956).
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Railroad Police Statute. 28 To the same effect is an opinion of Attorney General William Saxbe2 1 which is based to a great extent on
Neapolitan. The substance of the opinion is that a private police
officer "derives his authority from the ordinances of the appointing
municipality and from the laws of the state,"3 0 and has the same
powers and jurisdiction as given other police officers by state law
including the authority to arrest one who commits a misdemeanor
in his presence. 31 It should be kept in mind that fourth amendment
inquiries often turn on how much power the special police possess
and the capacity in which it is used. Because of the lack of effective
guidelines under the current Special Police Statute, the decisions
reached have not been easy or desirable. 32
The foregoing discussion on the powers of special police applies
to their jurisdiction as well; that is, whether the activities of the
special police are strictly tied to their employer's premises or
whether they are free to roam the city in search of criminal activity.
The broad sweep of the statute's language, the Neapolitan decision,
and the Saxbe opinion imply that jurisdiction is co-extensive with
the appointing city's limits. 33 While some flexibility is desirable,
conferring city-wide jurisdiction may be too extreme.
C.

The Railroad Police Statute
The Railroad Police Statute34 authorizes banks, building and
loan associations, railroad companies, and those who contract with
the United States Atomic Energy Commission to designate employees to be appointed "railroad policemen" by the governor. To protect their properties, these associations are empowered to make
rules and regulations which the railroad police are charged with
enforcing. For railroad police, the power to enforce is also the power
to arrest.35 The statute is primarily important to this discussion in
28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4973.17 (Page 1954); see discussion in Section II(c) infra.
29. 66 Op. ArT'Y GEN. 179 (1966).
30. Id. at 386.
31. Id. at 389.
32. The manner in which the courts have addressed the powers that have been conferred
on special police in conjunction with fourth and fifth amendment problems will be explored
in Section III infra.
33. Compare with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.041 (Page 1975) which allows detention
of shoplifters on or near store premises by express provision. See note 27 supra for authority
that they can. See also DAYTON, OHIO, CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 1024(d) (1971).
34. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4973.17-99 (Page 1954).
35. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4973.19 (Page 1954) which provides in pertinent part:
Power of police to enforce regulations and make arrests.
A company which avails itself of sections 4973.17 and 4973.18 of the Revised
Code may make needful regulations to promote the public convenience and
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terms of the litigation that it has spawned concerning the liability
of employers and their special and railroad police for tortious conduct in the performance of their duties," and for the direct grants
7
of power it gives to railroad policemen.
D.

Ohio Special Deputies

One category of special police deserves special mention: the
3
non-statutory special deputy sheriffs. " The authority for their crea3
tion is established by common law. " Today this common law power
is exercised by the filing of the necessary applications and fees and
approval by a common pleas judge, who is without authority to
place any limitations on the duties to be performed by the special
deputy." The duties and services that these special deputies perform for their employers are similar to those performed by municipal special police; the main difference is the level of government
issuing the licenses. Due to the lack of statutory authority for their
creation and the difficulties that this category has caused at least
one court," special deputy sheriffs are mentioned here as the ultimate square peg in the Ohio statutory scheme.
III.

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE LAW ON SPECIAL

POLICE

The first decisions dealing with special police involved railroad
police. 2 These cases primarily concerned the liability of railroad
safety in and about its depots, stations, and grounds, not inconsistent with
Policemen appointed under such sections shall enforce and compel
law ....
obedience to such regulations ...
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § § 4973.23 and 4973.25 (Page 1954) also give conductors the power
to arrest while on duty. Note that this section is one of the few that directly confers the power
to arrest on special police. Also, the grant of authority comes directly from the state and the
actions of the railroad police are, therefore, those of the sovereign.
New
36. See Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Deal, 116 Ohio St. 408, 156 N.E. 502 (1927);
v.
York, Chi. & St. L. R.R. Co. v. Fieback, 87 Ohio St. 254, 100 N.E. 889 (1912); McKain
677-89
645,
A.L.R.
35
Annot.,
(1909);
18
S.E.
64
223,
W.Va.
65
Baltimore & O.R.R. Co.,
65-74
(1925); Annot., 77 A.L.R. 927, 932-34 (1932), superseded by Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 15,
(1963).
see
37. For a brief history of the Railroad Police and some of the statutory variations
Watchmen, supra note 1, at 474-76 (1975).
38. See note 12 supra.
Ct.
39. See State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (Franklin County
Ct.
County
(Allen
294
N.E.2d
76
447,
App.
Ohio
80
App. 1975); State ex rel Geyer v. Griffin,
App. 1946).
40. State ex rel Geyer v. Griffin, 80 Ohio App. 447, 76 N.E.2d 294 (Allen County Ct. App.
1946).
41. See discussion of State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App.2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (Franklin
County Ct. App. 1975) in Section I infra.
cited
42. There is scant case law in Ohio and decisions from other jurisdictions will be
where germane to the discussion.
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police and their employers for tortious acts, false arrest, and malicious prosecution 3-master.servant problems which did not give
the courts occasion to deal with any constitutional questions.
Representative of the liability decisions and premier in Ohio is
New York, Chicago and St. Louis R.R. v. Fieback" which laid down
a standard for liability that recognized a split function for the private policeman'5-one official and one purely private. While this
analysis was appropriate for determining tort liability, it is inadequate for ascertaining the status of special policemen when constitutional questions arise. The difficulties are increased by the United
States Supreme Court decision of Burdeau v. McDowell," which
restrictively interpreted the fourth amendment 7 prohibitions
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, in analyzing constitutional questions it is necessary to examine the powers possessed
by the special policeman in each instance, and how he used them.
This represents current thinking," but, as will be shown later, there
is a better method of determining when a special policeman has
overstepped his constitutional boundaries.4
It should be noted that although a special policeman can be
granted all of the powers of a regularly employed police officer, and
these powers have often been interpreted broadly,5 0 when faced with
deciding their status for applying constitutional prohibitions, courts
have most often decided that they are private individuals." This has
43. See note 36 supra.
44. 87 Ohio St. 254, 100 N.E. 889 (1912).
45. The court held that although a special railroad policeman is commissioned at the
request of a private company, and is paid solely by that company, he is nevertheless a public
officer deriving his authority from the state, and his acts will be presumed to have been
performed in his capacity as such officer, until such presumption is overcome by sufficient
evidence. Id.
46. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides, in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
48. See State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (Franklin County Ct.
App. 1975); State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 271 N.W.2d 839 (1971).
49. The standard which will be advocated is whether the person violating the defendant's rights is paid to seek evidence of crime. See Section In infra; see Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d
553, 563 n.5 (1971).
50. See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 429 (1947), where the
Supreme Court stated that special police "when they are performing their police functions,
• . . are acting as public officers and assume all the powers and disabilities attaching
thereto." See also Neapolitan v. U.S. Steel Corp., 77 Ohio L. Abs. 376, 149 N.E.2d 589
(Mahoning County Ct. App. 1956).
51. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517
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led to an unfortunate parallel to the "silver platter doctrine"" but
on a much grander scale. As long as a special policeman is treated
as a private individual, a defendant will not be entitled to suppression of evidence at trial under the exclusionary rule of Weeks v.
United States,53 even if the method of obtaining the evidence would
otherwise contravene the Constitution. In effect the evidence is
handed over to local police and prosecutors on a platinum platter.
This section will attempt to analyze the principal Ohio decisions
that have led to this unfortunate result.
Special Police and the Fourth Amendment
It has long been held that the fourteenth amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures apply only to the
government and its agents.5 4 The prohibitions do not apply to private individuals unless they act in concert with, or at the direction
of, the police.15 Since most special policemen are employed to maintain order and detect evidence of crime, they are often involved in
situations where their activities may result in searches and seizures
that are of doubtful constitutionality. Where the same actions are
taken by regular police officers, the proper remedy is the exclusion
56
of the illegally seized evidence at trial. Thus, at present, when a
special policeman is involved in anunreasonable search, it must be
ascertained whether the powers he has been given constitute sufficient state involvement to require exclusion of evidence.
The most recent Ohio decision on this point is State v.

A.

(5th Cir. 1967); State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971); State v. McDaniel,
44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (Franklin County Ct. App. 1975); City of University
Heights v. Seibert, 26 Ohio Misc. 234, 270 N.E.2d 381 (Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971); City
of University Heights v. Conley, 20 Ohio Misc. 112, 252 N.E.2d 198 (Shaker Heights Mun.
Ct. 1969).
52. See notes 7 and 8 supra.
53. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
54. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517
(5th Cir. 1967); City of University Heights v. Seibert, 26 Ohio Misc. 234, 270 N.E. 2d 381
(Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971); Gunter v. State, 257 Ind. 524, 275 N.E.2d 810 (1971);
Guthrie v. State, 254 Ind. 356, 260 N.E.2d 579 (1970); City of University Heights v. Conley,
20 Ohio Misc. 112, 252 N.E.2d 198 (Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1969); People v. Randazzo, 220
Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1964).
55. Gandy v. Watkins, 237 F. Supp. 266 (M.D. Ala. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 946
(1965); State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (Franklin County Ct. App.
1975); Gunter v. State, 257 Ind. 524, 275 N.E.2d 810 (1971); Guthrie v. State, 254 Ind. 356,
260 N.E.2d 579 (1970); People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 874, 239 N.E.2d 625,
36 A.L.R.3d 547 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969).
56. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

Published by eCommons, 1977

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:2

McDaniel,5 7 argued before the Court of Appeals for Franklin
County. In that case security personnel of a Lazarus department
store, some eighty percent of whom were validly commissioned special deputy sheriffs for Franklin County, had employed a systematic
method of detecting shoplifting. The system consisted of mingling
with store patrons to detect suspicious activity, plus surreptitious
observations of patrons in store fitting rooms.58 In all of the cases
before the court59 there was insufficient probable cause for the observations which had resulted in the defendants' detention pursuant
to the Shoplifter Detention Statute. Only one of the security employees who made the contested observations, however, was a spe0
cial deputy sheriff.A
The court easily found that the search was unreasonable.61 Before the evidence could be supressed, however, the court had to find
state action. While the appellants conceded that the lone special
deputy involved was probably a police officer,12 the court concluded
that she was not. The court further reasoned that the security employees were acting wholly outside any authority they may have
possessed as special deputies, but within the scope of the authority
of their employers . 3 They were thus acting as private individuals
under the Burdeau rationale, and the exclusionary rule of Weeks v.
United States64 was not applicable.
Although this result may be technically correct based on the
57. 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (1975), motion to certify the record denied,
September 18, 1975.
58. Many ways of observing patrons in fitting rooms were revealed, including the removal of ceiling tiles to enable the security employee to observe as many as 12 unsuspecting
patrons at one time. The potential for abuse of a patron's privacy in this type of situation is
obvious. It should also be noted that no signs were posted which warned any customers that
security personnel may be observing them. 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 164-65, 337 N.E.2d 173, 175
(1975).
59. Six defendants in all were detected in this manner.
60. 44 Ohio App. 2d at 165, 337 N.E.2d at 175.
61. In dealing with the question of the reasonableness of the searches, the court, relying
on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), concluded that the fitting rooms provided a
reasonable expectation of privacy by the user, and that the observations were not supportable
by probable cause. Since the views of the defendants' activities that were obtained by the
security employees were not those that could normally be obtained by a store patron in the
area, that is, in open view, they were, therefore, unreasonable. For other cases involving
searches in private enclosures, see Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Buchanan v. State, 471 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972);
Brown v. State, 3 Md. App. 90, 238 A.2d 147 (1968); Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469,
374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962).
62. Brief of Appellant at 8, State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173
(Franklin County Ct. App. 1975).
63. 44 Ohio App. 2d at 173-74, 337 N.E.2d at 180 (1975).
64. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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lack of statutory authority for the creation of special deputies, it is
not sustainable in logic. If the underlying reason for the exclusionary
rule is to deter the sovereign and its agents, the police, from trampling on the rights of defendants, then the situation presented in
McDaniel is one where the rule should have a deterrent effect. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that special police, including special
deputies, are merely private individuals. Their detection activities
are sanctioned by statutory grants" or common law and they possess
powers beyond that of the ordinary citizen; that is, the power to
detain, to arrest, and to carry a concealed weapon after posting
bond. Although not full time government employees, they function
as police officers. The granting of licenses and the sanctioning of
weapons and uniforms is solely for the benefit of the employer in
that the state seeks to cloak special police with an aura of officiality
in order to enable them to effectively protect their employer's premises and customers. Such protection is normally the duty of the state
and is being delegated to the special police.
That special police are given a semblance of officiality is borne
out by an opinion of the Ohio Attorney General" rendered in response to a request for information regarding county liability for
actions of special deputies. The Attorney General described the
special deputies as follows:
In most cases these commissions are issued to men who are employed
as industrial plant guards, funeral escorts, shopping center policemen, and similar occupations where the holding of such a commission, and the attendantuniform, badge, and right to carry a gun, are
instrumental to. the performance of their duties. Generally speaking,
these men are not employed by the Sheriff, nor do they receive any
compensation from County funds. They are not under the supervision
of the Sheriff with regard to their employment; however, they do
constitute a reserve of deputies subject to call by the Sheriff if
needed."
It is easily concluded from the description given that these
special deputies act in a capacity far different from private individuals, and are clothed with every indicia of the police power of the
state. It is difficult to square this fact with the decision in McDaniel.
At this point a comparison to several New York decisions dealing with special patrolmen 8 is useful. In People v. Diaz," on facts
65. See notes 9, 10, 11, and 12 supra.
66. 1958 Op. ATTN GEN. 1645 (1958).
67. Id. at 41.
68. The New York equivalent of an Ohio special policeman licensed under the Special
Police Statute.
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nearly identical to those in McDaniel, the court-held that a special
patrolman was indeed acting in an official capacity even though
privately employed. This determination invoked the exclusionary
rule of Weeks. Although the New York statute is more specific,70 the
functions of the special patrolman are identical with the functions
of the Ohio special police. In concluding that special patrolmen
"possess power beyond those of the ordinary citizen,"'"
the court
cited People v. Smith 2 where that court said:
[Tihe special patrolman is appointed by the police commissioner,
subject to the orders of the commissioner, and may be removed by
the commissioner. Furthermore, while on duty she had the power to
arrest, book, fingerprint and photograph the defendant, bring the
defendant to court, appear with the defendant in the detention facility pending arraignment, and possess[es] all the powers and
[performs] all the duties of a peace officer while in the performance
73
of. . .[her] official duties.
The Smith court also quoted from People v. Brown:7'
It is . . .cynical to hold that the Fourth Amendment protections
apply to searches by police officers but not by other agents of the city
who are required . . .to perform like governmental functions, as
here, and at the same time claim that they are immune from constitutional restrictions placed upon governmental authority."
Although the decisions in McDaniel and Diaz may be harmonized on the basis that McDaniel concerned a non-statutory deputy
sheriff whose powers were ambiguous while the controlling New
York law in Diaz is quite specific, the distinction is superficial. Nonstatutory special deputies wield the same power and perform the
same functions as do Ohio special policemen and New York special
patrolmen.
Even the United States Supreme Court had no difficulty in
finding that special deputy sheriffs possess substantial power of the
state. In Griffin v. Maryland,7" a private security guard for an
amusement park who was deputized at the request of the park,
69.

85 Misc. 2d 41, 376 N.Y.S.2d 849 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 434a-7.0(e) (1970).
71. 85 Misc.2d 41, 44, 376 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851-52 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
72. 82 Misc. 2d 204, 368 N.Y.S.2d 954 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
73. Id. at 207-08, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
74. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1970, at 19, col. 2 (App. term, 1st Dept. 1970).
75. People v. Smith, 82 Misc. 2d 204, 208, 368 N.Y.S.2d 954, 958 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y.
County 1975) (dealing with a private guard at a city facility). When the special police are
acting under a grant of state authority, however, the public-private distinction is superficial.
76. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).

70.
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ordered several protesting blacks out of the facility in an attempt
to enforce the park's policy of racial segregation." To obtain a warrant, the employee asserted his status as a special deputy. The
United States Supreme Court held that the arrest constituted state
action under the fourteenth amendment, 8 and reasoned that "[ilf
an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act
under that authority, his action is state action. It is irrelevant that
he might have taken the same action had he acted in a purely
particular action which he took was not
private capacity or that the
'79
law.
state
by
authorized
In light of this characterization, the decision in McDaniel is
unsupportable. The same would be true even assuming the special
deputy claimed the lesser authority of the Shoplifter Detention
Statute. Since an ordinary citizen cannot arrest or detain for misdemeanors in Ohio, the statute vests the merchant or his employee
with a parcel of state power that is not given to the normal private
individual. An individual who possesses this type of power is not a
private citizen as contemplated by the fourth amendment and
Burdeau.Y8 When the power to detain is coupled with a special deputy's commission, the conclusion is inescapable that the special
deputy should be subject to the constitutional checks on the abuse
of police power.
A different result could have been reached in McDaniel with
respect to the non-commissioned security employees as well by
applying the sole recognized exception to the rule in Burdeau, that
is, where a private individual is acting in concert with, or at the
direction of a police officer."' Eighty percent of the security force
involved possessed special deputy commissions as well as the security director. Therefore, his security force would have been acting
in concert with him or at his direction in pursuing their activities.
The confusion caused by the current state of the law could be
obviated by the use of a much simpler and more preferable standard. The substance of this standard encompasses a different view
of what is meant by a private individual: no one should be considered private under Burdeau if he is employed or paid to detect
77. Id. at 131-32.
78. Id. at 135.
79. Id.
80. Unfortunately, not many courts agree with this position: see State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio
St. 2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971); City of University Heights v. Seibert, 26 Ohio Misc. 234,
270 N.E.2d 381 (Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971); City of University Heights v. Conley, 20
Ohio Misc. 112, 252 N.E.2d 198 (Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1969).
81. See note 55 supra.
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evidence of crime, or is delegated any more power than that possessed by the average citizen. Whenever a person meeting either of
these qualifications trammels a defendant's rights, the evidence so
gathered should be excluded at trial.
Perhaps a re-examination of the rationale of Burdeau is in order
as well. When Elkins v. United States12 signalled the end of the
silver platter doctrine and Mapp v. Ohio"' extended the exclusionary
rule to the states, the United States Supreme Court was not given
an opportunity to re-examine the validity of Burdeau.84 Such a reexamination is in order in view of the tremendous amount of evidence to which special police have access in the performance of their
duties.
In this regard it should be noted that when Elkins dispelled the
notion that the fourth amendment applied only to activities of federal law enforcement officials, the Supreme Court had occasion to
note that:
[tlo the victim it matters not whether his constitutional right has
been invaded by a federal agent or by a state officer. It would be a
curiously ambivalent rule that would require the courts of the United
States to differentiate between unconstitutionally seized evidence
upon so arbitrary a basis. Such a distinction indeed would appear to
reflect an indefensibly selective evaluation of the provisions of the
Constitution."
The Court also cited then Judge Cardozo, in People v. Defore, 6
where he stated that, "[tihe professed object of the trespass rather
than the official character of the trespasser should test the rights of
government. . . .A government would be disingenuous, if, in determining the use that should be made of evidence drawn from such a
source, it drew a line between [federal and state officials]." 87 Similarly it would make no sense to sanction the use of special police,
and then shield them from the reach of the Constitution-the violation of the defendant's rights is the same.
82. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
83. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
84. See People v. Williams, 53 Misc. 2d 1086, 281 N.Y.S.2d 251 (City Ct. of the City of
Syracuse, Crim. Div. 1967). The court reluctantly followed Burdeau, but urged a reexamination of its rationale. The court stated:
It seems ludicrous to say that a District Attorney in prosecuting a defendant cannot
use evidence obtained by a policeman in derogation of a defendant's constitutional
rights, but can use the same evidence obtained by a private person in derogation of a
defendant's constitutional rights which in turn is handed over to a policeman who then
hands it over to a District Attorney. 53 Misc.2d 1086, 1091, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 256 (1967).
85. 364 U.S. 206, 215 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
86. 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
87. 364 U.S. 206, 215 n.7 (1960).
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Special Police and the Fifth Amendment.
While the focal point of the discussion so far has been the
interaction of special police and the fourth amendment, their status
with regard to the fifth amendment bears brief mention. Much of
the preceding commentary regarding the fourth amendment applies
to the fifth as well. The use of the police power of the state by special
police should require them to respect a potential defendant's rights
against self-incrimination. Further, the standard should be the
same. Those who are employed or paid to seek evidence of crime,
or are given any more power than the power possessed by the average citizen should be required to give the warnings set out in
B.

88
Miranda v. Arizona.

That a special policeman who has been duly commissioned is
involved should present no problems in enforcing the dictates of
Miranda; however, when a non-commissioned store employee has
made a detention pursuant to the Shoplifter Detention Statute a
thorny question arises. Several state courts have held that a person
statute need
exercising authority under a state shoplifter detention
8
not apprise a defendant of his constitutional rights.
That Miranda warnings are not required is true of Ohio as well.
In State v. Bolan" the Ohio Supreme Court held that store employees acting pursuant to the Shoplifter Detention Statute need not
give a detained shoplifter any Miranda warnings. The rationale is
that Miranda applies only to law enforcement officers who are conducting a custodial interrogation. In such a situation the seemingly
overwhelming power of the state is brought to bear on the accused.
When private security guards conduct a custodial interrogation,
however, the trauma and danger to the defendant can be even
greater since there is no effective check on the guards' activities. In
the time that it takes for the regular police to arrive, even assuming
that they are called in immediately, store employees can coerce a
confession which will be fully admissible in court."'
88. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
89. See cases collected in State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 18-19, 271 N.E.2d 839, 842
(1971). It should be noted that many of the cases relied on by the court do not involve
custodial interrogations by special police, but are concerned with statements to purely private
individuals to whom Miranda was never meant to apply. Of those cases cited in Bolan only
State v. Masters, 261 Iowa 366, 154 N.W.2d 133 (1967); State v. Hess, 9 Ariz. App. 29, 449
P.2d 46 (1969); People v. Vlcek, 114 Ill. App. 2d 74, 252 N.E.2d 377 (1969); and People v.
Wright, 249 Cal. App. 2d 692, 57 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1967) are really apposite.
90. 27 Ohio St.2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971).
91. This type of activity, if conducted by special police or merchants' employees, may
also be violative of the dictates of the Shoplifter Detention Statutes which decrees that the
detention be in a reasonable manner for a reasonable time.
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For the same reasons that they are considered to be public
officials for the fourth amendment, special police should also be
considered public officials for the purposes of the fifth amendment.
When special police conduct a custodial interrogation without the
benefit of the required Miranda warnings, any confessions obtained
should be held inadmissible. To the extent that it holds to the
contrary, State v. Bolan is untenable.
IV.

CONCLUSION

While the use of special police can be a great source of problems, the situation is by no means hopeless.2 The first positive step
in remedying the confusion surrounding the use of special police is
to urge the repeal or consolidation of the multitude of statutes that
authorize the various types of special policemen, and to draft a
fairly specific statute that will apply to all governmental levels,
including the counties, thus clearing the doubts surrounding nonstatutory special deputies. The statute should also attempt to define the powers and jurisdiction that can be conferred on special
3
police.

In the meantime, the courts should expressly recognize the
quasi-public status of the special police and strictly enforce the
constitutional curbs on the use of the special police powers. The
special police, then, would no longer be able to hand over illicit
evidence on a platinum platter. To this end a re-examination of the
rationales of Burdeau, Bolan, and McDaniel are in order.
B. C. Petroziello
92. In this connection see Comment, Private Police in California: A Legislative
Proposal, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 115 (1974).
93. Some of the other specifics should be aimed at curbing potential abuses of the
special police power. These provisions should attempt to insure that restrictions on weapons
are strictly enforced and that the special police are at least minimally trained. The current
training requirements are specified in OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 109.77 (Page Supp. 1975).
See also Comment, Private Police in California:A Legislative Proposal,5 GOLDEN GATE L.
REv. 115 (1974).
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